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RECOGNIZING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
OF MEDIA ACCESS TO EVIDENTIARY
RECORDINGS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS

As a result of the broadcast media's expanding news coverage of
criminal trials, 1 journalists increasingly seek access to audio or video
recordings that have been introduced into evidence at trial. 2 Such evidentiary recordings are well suited to the distinctive needs and characteristics
of the broadcast media. 3 But the same features of the recordings that
attract the interest of broadcast media likewise pose the danger of prejudicial pretrial publicity, which undermines a defendant's right to a
fair trial. 4
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized that the news media's
access to evidentiary recordings is protected by the Constitution. s Consequently, the legal bases of the media's access are uncertain, and courts
1. Traditionally broadcast media were not interested in covering judicial proceedings. See
Wilson, Justice in Living Color: The Case for Courtroom Television, 60 A.B.A. J. 294, 294 (1974).
The traditional lack of interest resulted from the numerous restrictions placed on the means
of covering judicial proceedings. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited
or a Mode.st Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-gathering Process, 1980
Dma; L.J. 641, 663. American Bar Association Canons and the Estes v. Texas decision, 381
U.S. S32 (196S), were widely believed to prevent camera or broadcast coverage of trials. See
D'Alemberte, Cameras in the Courtroom, LmoATION, Fall 1982, at 20. For many years some
courts also prohibited sketch artists. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 497
F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974). Even with the use of artists' sketches, coverage seemed so stilted
that broadcasters frequently decided not to cover judicial proceedings at all. See Spann, Cameras
in the Courtroom - for Better or for Worse, 64 A.B.A. J. 797, 797 (1978).
2. The tenn "recordings" includes both audio and video recordings. The term "evidentiary
recordings" denotes recordings that have been admitted into evidence at criminal trials.
3. The broadcast media generally attempt to communicate news dramatically. It must attract
the attention of an audience that may simultaneously be engaged in -other activities and thus
it emphasizes the representation of events rather than the narration of a description. See Lichty,
Video versus Print, WILSON Q.• Special Issue 1982, at 49, S2-S3. See generally I. FAN0, TELEVI•
SION NEWS, RADIO NEWS 184, 186 (1980); E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 19S-96, 263 {1973);
Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 662.
4. The deleterious effect of prejudicial publicity on a defendant's right to a fair trial has
been a perennial problem. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. S39, S47 (1976); Irvin
·V. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 {1961). See generally REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON THE OPERATION
OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS - FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 4S F.R.D. 391, 394-95 {1968);
Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Fair Trial and Due Process, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1S7,
164; Douglass, Media Technology, Fair Trial, and the Citizen's Right to Know, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 364, 36S-66 (1982); Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 39, 40 (1979).
S. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. One trial court has recognized that the public
has a first amendment right of access to court records, including evidentiary recordings. United
States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292 {E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 21 {2d Cir. 1982).
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may deny the media access without properly analyzing the conflicting
rights and interests present in particular cases. 6 As a result, courts may
deny the broadcast media access to evidentiary recordings even when
such access does not conflict with the rights of a defendant. 7
This Note advocates recognition of a constitutional right of press
access to evidentiary recordings in criminal trials. It proposes methods
for accommodating the competing rights of the news media to have
access to evidentiary recordings used in criminal trials and the right
of criminal defendants to a fair trial. Part I examines the source of
controversy and sets forth the limitations inherent in the current common law presumption of press access to judicial records. Part II dis<!usses
the underlying values that require recognition of the constitutional right
and suggests that such a right can be accommodated with a defendant's right to a fair trial.

I.

THE CoNTROVERSY OVER PRESS ACCESS

To

EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS

In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 8 the Supreme Court confronted suddenly, for the first time, and without benefit of extensive
prior state or federal litigation, the question of whether the broadcast
media should be granted access to evidentiary recordings. 9 In this case,
news broadcasters seeking access to the Watergate tapes asserted that
the first and sixth amendments supported their right to copy and broadcast the tapes. 10 Although the Court found unique statutory grounds
6. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 34-37 & 70 and accompanying text.
8. 43S U.S. S89 (1978).
9. The Court acknowledged that the scope of the media access was a rarely litigated issue.
Id. at S97. Despite the absence of prior litigation, the issue of access is significant. There may
be many more instances than are suggested by the reported case law. A grant or denial of access
is merely one of many orders issued by a trial judge and, unless appealed, is unlikely to be
reported. Historically, broadcasters have not aggressively asserted their first amendment rights.
See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation
of the Mass media, 1S MICH. L. R.Ev. I, 17 (1976). Because of the time pressures the broadcast
media face, they are unlikely to appeal a denial of access. See I. FANG, supra note 3, at 171.
By the time an order reversing the denial of access can be obtained, the material sought will
often no longer have any news value. Consequently, prudent use of resources would lead the
news media to contest denials of access to evidentiary recordings only in especially significant cases.
This inhibition of the exercise of first amendment rights that inevitably results from any form
of prior restraint or restriction on the newsgathering process has been frequently recognized and
deplored. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 4T/ U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Fahringer, Charting
a Course From the Free Press to a Fair Trial, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. S-9 (1978); Landau,
Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A. J. SS, S9-60 (1976). But see
Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Mnm. L. REv. 11, 64-66
(1981) (expressing skepticism that a few days delay in reporting on judicial proceeding, is devastating
to the news value of such reports).
10. 435 U.S. at 608-10. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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for its decision denying access, 11 it stated that the first and sixth amendments did not require a different result. 12
Even before the Supreme Court's rejection of a constitutional right
of news media access to evidentiary recordings, persons seeking the
release of such recordings resorted to a common law presumption in
favor of access to judicial and other official records 13 that "predates
the Constitution itself."" After the Court's refusal to recognize a constitutional right of access, the common law presumption remains the
only effective means for third parties to obtain access to evidence used
in trials.

A. Presumption of Access to Judicial Records at Common Law
American courts traditionally have allowed nonlitigants access to
judicial records without requiring any showing of special need or
interest. 15 Nevertheless, if a request for access is motivated by private
spite, a desire to promote public scandal, or other improper motive,
courts have discretion to deny access. 16
Access to official records includes both the inspection and copying
of the record.'7 Although the common law presumption that access
11. Although neither of the parties thought it was applicable, the Court relied on the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, Title I, §§ 101-106, 44 U.S.C.
§ 2107 note (1976). The Court interpreted the Act as providing that the legislative and executive
branches control public access to presidential records; consequently, it concluded that release
of the tapes by courts would be improper. 43S U.S. at 603-06.
12. 435 U.S. at 608.
13. It is well established that public records include judicial records. See, e.g., Nixon, 435
U.S. at 597; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 89S-99 (E.D.
Pa. 1981). See generally H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIOHT TO KNow 136 (19S3).
·
14. United States v. Mitchell, S51 F.2d 12S2, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. S89 (1978).
15. At common law, English courts required a nonlitigant seeking access to court records
to demonstrate a property interest in the document or to show a need for the document as evidence
in another lawsuit. American courts have rarely followed the limitations on access adopted by
the English courts. Rather, American courts have tended to allow all citizens access to court
records. See N°1Jton v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. S89, 597-98 (1978). See generally
Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape Evidence: A Threat to the Fair Trial
Right, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. S51, S57-S8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Copying and Broadcasting]; Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or
On Cameras, 16 GA. L. REv. 659, 660 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Common Law Right);
Comment, All Courts Should Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judicial Proceedings and
Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 337-39 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, All Courts Should

Be Open).
16. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, 598 (1978); City of
St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., S19 S.W.2d 811, 81S (Ky. 1974). See generally
Comment, All Courts Should Be Open, supra note IS, at 343-44.
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, S97 {1978); United States
v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 600, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 63S F.2d 94S, 949 (2d Cir. 1980); Ortiz v. Jaramillo,
82 N.M. 44S, 446, 483 P.2d S00, S01 (1971); H. Caoss, supra note 13, at 34. See generally 66
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includes the right to copy stems from a time when all records were
documentary, courts universally have assumed that the presumption
applies equally to nondocumentary records.18
American courts have allowed public access to official records because
they have considered such access to be fundamental to democratic
society. 19 Access promotes values· underlying the first amendment by
ensuring an "informed and enlightened public opinion" regarding matters documented by the records. 20 Access also promotes values underlying the sixth amendment by " '[safeguarding] against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution,' . . . [promoting]
the search for truth, and ... [assuring] 'confidence in ... judicial
remedies.' " 21
Despite the importance placed on the common law presumption of
public access to official records, the courts have not delineated clearly
the scope of public access. The Supreme Court has found it "difficult
to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive
definition of [the presumption in favor of access] . . . or to identify
all the factors to be weighed in determining whether access is
appropriate. " 22 The Court has declined to define the limits of the
presumption and has left the scope of access to be determined by trial
courts ''in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the parAM. JuR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 13 (1973) (without the right to copy, the right to
inspect is "practically valueless"). But see Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super. 233, 240, 217
A.2d 22, 26-27 (1966) (request to copy audio recordings of public municipal hearing denied when
any resident could listen to tapes and get copy of stenographic transcription).
18. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); see also Ortiz
v. Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 446-47, 483 P.2d 500, 501-02 (1971).
The judicial extension of the right to copy public documents to include nondocumentary public
records was not required by the original considerations supporting a right to copy. In the past,
most records were documentary, so coextensive rights to copy and inspect conferred little more
than the opportunity to obtain the essential discursive information contained by the documents.
More sophisticated methods of copying documents, e.g., photocopying, were accepted without
question because they merely provided a more efficient method for duplicating the discursive
content of documentary records.
In contrast, a right to copy nondocumentary material ensures not only that the discursive content of the public record can be recorded, but it also permits dissemination of the nondiscursive
content of the records, such as intonation, pauses, and body language.
Although access might have been denied on the basis that the presumption in favor of access
extended only to the type of information contained in documentary records, it is now established
that the presumption of access extends to nondocumentary public records and that such access
includes the right to copy. United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d
609, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Cf. Note, Common Law Right, supra note 15, a_t 666 (sound public policy requires access
because every individual is presumed to know the law).
20. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
21. Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 237, 270 & n.24 (1948)).
22. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978).
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ticular case. m 3 Judicial controversy has erupted as courts have attempted
to define more precisely the strength of the presumption in favor of
access in the context of evidentiary recordings.
Several courts have acknowledged the absence of a specific constitutional right of access to evidentiary recordings but have emphasized
nonetheless the close connection between the common law presumption of access and freedoms that are constitutionally protected by the
first and sixth amendments. 24 Due to their common heritage, both the
presumption of access and the sixth amendment are said to promote
a "community catharsis" and to satisfy public ·desire for justice. 25
Moreover, access to judicial records enhances the public observation
and understanding of the criminal justice process, 26 thus increasing the
benefits resulting from the constitutional protection of the right to a
public trial and the right to free expression of ideas. 21
Courts have recognized that the practical limitations on the public's
opportunity to attend trial proceedings28 and the ease with which replication and broadcast can be accomplished are also important factors in
support of the presumption of access. 29 One court has held that after
recordings have been played in court, only the "most extraordinary circumstances" justify restrictions on the opportunity of persons who were
not present to see or hear the recordings. 30
In balancing the defendant's fair trial rights with the presumption
of access, courts recognizing a strong presumption of access have
minimized the potential adverse effect on a defendant's right to a fair
trial._ These courts have hel~ that access should be denied only when
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.}, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Mouzin, 559 F. Supp. 463, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Other courts have recognized
a "strong" presumption in favor of public access to judicial records, including evidentiary recordings. They have held that the presumption is not rebutted by possible prejudice to a defendant's
fair trial rights that is highly speculative. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 540 F. Supp.
769 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
25. United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir.
1981); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality opinion).
26. See United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d
Cir. 1981).
27. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
28. See United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers (In,,.re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d
Cir. 1980).
29. See United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d
Cir. 1980).
30. Id.; see also United States v. Pageau, 535 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States
v. Dean, 527 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Griffin Television, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1947 (W.D. Okla. 1981); United States v. Reiter, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1927 (D. Md. 1981).
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"actual, as opposed to hypothetical, factors demonstrate that justice
so requires. " 31 For these courts the mere possibility that jurors would
be prejudiced as a result of broader dissemination of evidence already
held admissible poses no significant risk to a fair trial. 32 When there
is only a small likelihood of a second trial or a trial on a related issue,
courts advocating a strong presumption in favor of public access to
records conclude that "the interest in avoiding the risk of potential
prejudice ... is seldom of sufficient weight to justify denying access. " 33
In contrast, other courts give less weight to the presumption of access. Because access is not a constitutional right, these courts conclude
that it is counterbalanced by even a slight threat to a constitutional
right. 34 For these courts, the right of access is "undeniably important"
but does not merit the same degree of judicial protection as the freedom
of the press guarantee. 35 It is ''merely one of the interests to be weighed
on the broadcasters' 'side of the scales.• m 6
Because the presumption of access is not specifically protected by
the Constitution, the courts that differentiate the presumption 'rrom
underlying interests served by the first amendment conclude that effects of access on a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial should
be given much greater weight than any improvement of public
understanding that might result from permitting access. 37 Consequently
the effect on the freedom of the press interests is minimized; courts
find the interest of the press satisfied by providing transcripts and permitting the broadcast press to view and hear the evidentiary recording. 38

B.

Limitations of the Common Law Presumption
of Access- to Court Records

Courts adopting a strong presumption in favor of news media ac31. United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F2d 1289, 1290 (7th Cir. 1982);
see also United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
32. See United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
34. See, e.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Bolen, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
35. See Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. Id. at 434 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, 602 (1978))
(emphasis in original).
37. See, e.g., id. at 431 ("It is better to err, if err we must, on the side of generosity in
the protection of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.").
38. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,609 (1978); Belo Broad-
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cess to evidentiary recordings respond more adequately to the competing interests that merit judicial recognition than do courts adopting
the·mechanical approach that finds the presumption overcome by the
possible existence of any conflicting constitutional interest. Nevertheless,
failure to give the presumption of access a constitutional basis weakens
the analysis of courts recognizing a strong presumption of access.

1. Elevation of nonconstitutional interests above recognized constitutional rights- Adoption of a strong presumption of access neglects
the distinction between rights protected by the federal Constitution and
privileges that derive from the common law tradition of American legal
institutions. By acknowledging that the bases of the presumption are
nonconstitutional yet allowing that presumption to counterbalance a
defendanes right to a fair trial, courts effectively allow a common law
privilege to exceed the recognized scope of the constitutional rights
to which it is related.
The theoretical incoherence is the result of a false starting-point of
the legal analysis. Although the procedural issue is posed in terms of
access, the true underlying conflict of interests stems from the prospective public dissemination of information. It is only because courts
cannot effectively prohibit the broadcast of evidentiary recordings after
the news media have obtained copies of them 39 that the issue is posed
in terms of restricting the right of access or eliminating a right to copy
from the scope of the right of access.

2. Failure to consider adequately the independent interests of news
media- Courts acknowledge that the presumption in favor of access
effectuates values traditionally protected by the first amendment, 40 but
they sometimes implement the presumption by considering whether the
public has sufficient understanding of a judicial proceeding and whether
broadcast of the evidentiary recordings is an "improper purpose. ,, 41
Such an analysis does not recognize either the independent interest of
the news media, the party actually seeking access, .or the unique role
of the news media in effectuating first amendment interests.
By determining whether the public has sufficient understanding of
events, the courts elaborate impermissible limitations on the free communication of information. In fact, it is only in the context of the
casting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bolen, 8 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1048, 1049 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
39. Judicial use of prior restraints to prevent publication of information in the hands of
the press is strictly limited by the Constitution. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
40. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
41. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); United States"v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v.
Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.),
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
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_competing interests of fair trial and free press that the level of public
understanding assumes significance. Any increase of public understanding is a recognized social value, and the sufficiency of public understanding can be only a minimum acceptable- level, against which other interests can be balanced. Courts should not, as the starting-point of
their analysis, decide whether the increase in public understanding of
an event that results from exposure to the evidentiary recordings is
necessary.
Such a paternalistic approach is objectionable as a matter of public
policy. Moreover, judicial selection of information that is acceptable
for broadcast directly interferes with the interest of the news media
to gather and disseminate information, to make editorial judgments
about the public presentation of information, 42 and to choose the form
in which information will be communicated. 43
3. Vagueness and irrelevance of factors considered in applying the
presumption- Because the presumption in favor of access can be rebutted by an improper purpose, courts consider not only the public interest in dissemination of the information but also the integrity of the
judicial system and the motives of the news media.
_ The standards for determining improper purpose are subjective and
vague. The doctrine may be applied beneficially to protect privacy interests of individuals who appear in the recordings, yet improper purpose may also be interpreted expansively to deny access to legitimately
interested parties. Because the interests of the news media are not
theoretically recognized in applying the presumption of access, they
are either ignored or possibly considered improper.
Moreover, considerations of purpose are irrelevant. It is not the
motives for, but the consequences of, the broadcast of the evidentiary
recordings that potentially affect the defendant's- right to a fair trial,
the public's interest in being fully informed, and the judicial system's
distinct interests in preserving its integrity.
II.

RECOGNIZING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
ACCESS To EVIDENTIARY RECORDINGS

The United States Supreme Court recently held that a state statute
closing trials during the testimony of rape victims violated the constitutional right of the public to attend criminal trials. 44 Notwithstand42. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
43. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 516 (1980) (plurality
opinion). See generally Denniston, Right of Access: Birth of a Concept, 2 CAL. LAW., Nov. 1982;
at 47; Note, A Foot in the Government's Door - Access Rights of the Press and Public: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 12 U. ToL. L. REv. 991, 1006-26 (1981).
44. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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ing the availability of alternative sources of information regarding the
substance of the testimony, the Court found rooted in the first amendment the right of access by the press to criminal trials. 45 Despite a
clear opportunity to limit the right of access to physical attendance, 46
the opinion broadly interpreted the first amendment to include the exercise of rights "necessary to the enjoyment of other [established] First
Amendment rights, " 47 and characterized the right of access to criminal
trials as necessary to assure the effective exercise of free discussion
of government fµnctions. 48
The basic social interests requiring the recognition of a constitutional
right of public access to criminal trials are the same interests that lead
courts to adopt the presumption of access to evidentiary recordings:
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging public
scrutiny and protecting the informed participation of citizens in the
government. 49 Moreover, the constitutional analysis adopted by the
Court in recognizing the right of access by the public and press to
criminal trials strongly suggests •that that right should be extended to
embrace the right of the press to have access to evidentiary recordings
in criminal trials for purposes of copying and broadcasting them.

A.

The Devitalization of Supreme Court Precedent
Denying a Constitutional Right of Access

The Supreme Court's denial of a constitutional basis for a right of
access to evidentiary proceedings 50 is of questionable authority after

45. The Massachusetts trial court had ordered the exclusion of the press and public during
the testimony of a minor rape victim, but the court did not deny the press access to the trial
transcript, thus assuring that the press and public had "prompt and full access to all of the
victim's testimony." Id. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nor was the press denied access to
court personnel or other sources that provided an account of the testimony. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held that the mandatory closure statute violated the first amendment right of
access to criminal trials. Id. at 2622.
46. The Court previously recognized only a constitutional right to attend crimiJial trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980) (plurality opinion). Concurring
opinions, however, elaborated a first amendment basis for a broader right of access to criminal
trials. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 586-89
(Brennan, J., concurring). In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court could have based its decision on the holding of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. without discussing the opinions of the concurring justices.
47. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); see also Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
48. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982).
49. Compare Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (constitutional right to attend trial) with United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (presumption of access to evidentiary recordings), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
50. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
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the Court's articulation of the constitutional right of access by the press
to criminal trials.
1. Unique fact situation confronted by the Court in prior caseIn confronting the issue of press access to evidentiary recordings for
the first time, 51 the Court had faced a unique situation. Broadcasters
sought access to audio recordings introduced as evidence during criminal
prosecutions stemming from the Watergate scandal, and the source
of the tapes raised difficult issues of executive privilege. The Court
denied access to presidential tapes because recent federal legislation
provided a more appropriate method for public access. 52 Because of
the unique circumstances of the case, its general applicability to other
cases was limited from the start. 53
2. Subsequent erosion of underpinnings of the Court's sixth amendment analysis- Several of the assumptions critical for the Court's denial
of a constitutional right of access to evidentiary recordings have been
subsequently eroded. For example, the Court rejected the sixth amendment as a basis for press access to the evidentiary recordings. The Court
reasoned that although public understanding remained incomplete
without an opportunity to hear the recordings, public understanding
remained similarly incomplete with respect to the testimony of witnesses,
yet there was no constitutional right to have such testimony recorded
and broadcast. 54 The Court's assumption unnecessarily expanded its
prior limitation on press access. ss Moreover, subsequent cases have made
clear that the Constitution requires no general
on broadcast coverage
of trials. 56 Indeed, it is no longer clear that there is no constitutional
right to broadcast testimony of live witnesses. 57 Nor does the absence

oan

SI. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note I I.
·
53. Zimmerman, supra note I, at 652, suggests that the failure of any member of the Court
to cite Nixon in the next case involving media use of communications technology to gather news,
Houchkins v. KQED, 438 U.S. I (1978), supports the view of Nixon as a unique case.
54. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).
55. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In fact, the Court had established in earlier cases
only that broadcast of judicial proceedings was impermissible when such broadcast deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. See id. at 540-44. The logic of the precedent relied on by the Court
was not applicable to the issue of access to evidentiary recordings, for virtually all the factors
pertained to technical aspects of live broadcast of trials. Much of the Court's discussion of the
potentially prejudicial impact of televising a trial focused on the disruption caused simply by
the presence of the apparatus required for television. The Court was especially concerned that
cameras might distract judges, witnesses, and jurors, and otherwise generally intrude upon the
court proceedings. Id. at 544-51. The broadcast of evidentiary recordings copied out of court
presents no such problems.
56. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). Chandler did not decide whether a first
amendment right of access to trials includes a right to broadcast trials, but at least one commentator believes recognition of such a right is only a matter of time. See Ares, supra note 4, at
175-77. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 1.
57. Commentators have advocated recognition of a constitutional "technological right of
access" which would mean a constitutional right to broadcast trials. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra
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of a recognized constitutional right to broadcast trials negate a constitutional right of access to evidentiary recordings for purposes of
broadcast. On the contrary, live broadcast of a trial raises due process
problems that are not presented by the broadcast of evidence that is
copied out of court. 58
3. Press participation is essential to the guarantee of a public trialIn previously denying that press access to evidentiary recordings was
constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the right to a public trial protected press access to evidentiary
recordings. The Court denied the press's standing to assert this argument on the basis that the public trial guarantee was for the benefit
of the defendant and conferred no special benefit on the press. Consequently, the sixth amendment was satisfied by allowing part of the·
public and press to attend a criminal trial. 59 But the Court has recently
recognized that the press has a distinct first amendment interest in a
public trial, and that press access promotes interests of both the public
and the defendant. 60
4. The scope of physical access of the press is not necessarily limited
to that of the general public- In refusing to recognize a special right
of the news media to have access to evidentiary recordings, the Supreme
Court concluded that news media were seeking "physical accegs" to
evidence that was greater than that to which the public was entitled;
the Court held that the rights of the press with regard to judicial proceedings are no greater than the rights of the general public. 61
note 1, at 654-65. Even without a constitutional requirement, 37 states now allow cameras in
trial or appellate courts on some basis according to the Reporters's Committee for Freedom
of the Press. See Cameras in Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1213, 1213 (1983).
58. See supra note 55. In addition to the possible effect on trial participants noted in Estes,
broadcast of trial proceedings exposes jurors and witnesses to publicity, which is troubling because
they neither sought nor acted in such a manner prior to the trial as to attract such public attention. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
In contrast, the depiction of innocent third parties in evidentiary recordings is rare. Compare
In re KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980) (activity involving a victim preceding
a rape videotaped by the rapist) with United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting
Co.), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir.1981) (public official accepting a bribe filmed by hidden camera)
and United States v. Bolen, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (activities of a moneylaundering service connected with a drug conspiracy).
Similarly, allowing the videotaping of an entire trial may more readily result in the dissemina.tion of misleading or prejudicial information because an entire trial will likely be compressed
into a two to three minute clip whereas an evidentiary recording will often not exceed two or
three minutes. See generally Ares, supra note 4, at 177-82; Kamisar, Chandler v. Florida: What
Can Be Said for a "Right of Access" to Televise Judicial Proceedings?, in 3 THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 149, 160-65 (1982).
S9. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).
60. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 5S5, 566-18 (1980) (plurality opinion).
61. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978). Ironically,
the Court has failed to make a similar distinction in its analysis of the common law presumption
of access.
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Nevertheless, although the general right of press access to judicial
proceedings derives in part from the corresponding right of the public,
the scope of the two need not be identical. On the contrary, precisely
because press access is a crucial means of effectuating public access,
the first amendment supports greater access for the news media than
for individual citizens. 62
5. The extent of 'physical access" is reduced by technological
changes- By emphasizing the "physical access" necessary for the news
media to reproduce evidentiary recordings, 63 the Court tacitly expressed
concern about the inconvenience caused by the access. Although
inconvenience is a legitimate concern, the "physical access" concept
is artificial in the context of replicating evidentiary recordings. Copying of any public record is a recognized component of access 64 and
necessarily requires some sort of physical contact with or proximity
to the record. In practice, the distinction between the physical access
required for viewing, for photocopying, and for videotaping is insignificant. Moreover, any inconveniences will be reduced further as
technological changes make recording techniques easier and faster.

B.

Underlying Constitutional Values Compelling
Recognition of a Constitutional Right of
Press Access to Evidentiary Recordings

The underlying values the Court sought to promote by recognizing
the right of the press to attend criminal trials similarly compel recognition of a constitutional right of press access to evidentiary recordings
used in criminal trials. The establishment of the press's right of access
62. Individual Justices of the Supreme Court have advocated recognition of an independent
function for the press clause of the first amendment. See, e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73, 577 n.12 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[P}eople now acquire [information about trials} chiefly through the print and electronic
media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.");
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Criden
(In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
Because of the unique public interest function of the press, it is frequently provided with amenities
not available to the general public such as a press room or press pass. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that preferential treatment of the press is appropriate. Thus, preferential seating
for representatives of the media is proper when the courtroom is not large enough to accomodate
all who wish to attend. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (1980)
(plurality opinion); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan, concurring in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., noted that as a practical matter
the institutional press would often be the "fitting chief beneficiary of a right of access because
[it] serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens and funnels information about trials to a large
number of individuals." 448 U.S. at 586 n.2.
63. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978).
64. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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to the trial reflects the Court's acceptance of the fact that the public
depends upon the press for information. 65 The press must be allowed
to disseminate complete information about a trial in order for the public
to be able to understand the trial most fully and to participate most
effectively in the political system. Because "actual observation of
testimony or exhibits contributes a dimension [of information] which
cannot be fully provided by second-hand reports," 66 when aspects of
actual observation can be reproduced by the broadcast of evidentiary
recordings, such broadcast is desirable.
Recordings used as evidence in criminal trials may be important to
the eventual verdict. 67 Indeed, the use of evidentiary recordings at trial
may be a highly controversial issue, especially if the defendant is a
public official. 68 There may be several plausible interpretations of the
events depicted in the recordings. For the public to be in the best position to evaluate the facts and come to an informed opinion regarding
the use of such evidence, it must experience the evidentiary recordings
that are the actual subject of political and legal controversy. A mere
description of the contents of such evidence no more satisfies the public's
first amendment interests than does availability of alternative sources
of information concerning the substance of a witness's testimony. 69
C.

Accommodating the Right of the Press to Recordings
With Defendants' Right to a Fair Trial

Recognition of a press right of access to evidentiary recordings need
not conflict with the defendant's interest in a fair trial. 10 Moreover,
6S. See supra note 62.
66. United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981).
67. It is not yet clear what probative weight jurors give evidentiary recordings. See Raburn,
Videotapes in Criminal Courts: Prosecutors on Camera, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 425-26 (1981).
Such recordings are, however, merely a more sophisticated variety of demonstrative evidence.
See Heffernan, Effective Use of Demonstrative Evidence "Seeing is Believing", 5 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 427, 430 (1982). Demonstrative evidence has an "immediacy and reality which endow
it with particularly persuasive effect." McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OP nm LAW OP EVIDENCE 524-2S
(E. Cleary 2d ed. i972). Consequently, the outcome of a trial will likely be significantly affected
by the content of an evidentiary recording; see also German, Merin & Rolfe, Videotape Evidence
at Trial, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 209, 229 (1982). Nevenheless, the actual trial of a case in which
evidentiary recordings play a major role "presents the same challenge as a case with any other
form of evidence." Sear, How to Try a Tape Case, LmGATION, Fall 1982, at 28-30.
68. See United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d
Cir. 1981). See generally Tigar, Crime on Camera, LmGATION, Fall 1982, at 24. The propriety
of law enforcement use of cenain tactics may well be at issue. To some, the circumstances in
which the evidentiary recording was made may seem "contrived and the scene too carefully arranged to resolve ambiguities in the government's favor." Id. at 2S. To others, the same recorded material may show a defendant eager to violate the law.
69. CJ. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Coun, 4S7 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982).
70. The defendant may not object to the use of evidentiary recordings by the press and might
even join the news media's motion for access. In a case already highly publicized, broadcast
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in most cases where there is potential conflict, the news media's right
can be accommodated with the defendant's right to a fair trial. As
a last resort, access should be limited if necessary to protect the defendant's right; but the press should be denied access only if a defendant
can demonstrate that his right to a fair trial cannot be protected by
less restrictive means. Any denial of access should be "narrowly
tailored." 11
1. The prejudicial effect of broadcast publicity on jurors compared
with the effect of other kinds of publicity- Jurors can be prejudiced
by exposure to evidentiary recordings or any other evidence outside
the courtroom. 12 Some have argued that exposure to evidentiary recordings presents a greater danger of prejudice than other forms of evidence
because broadcast media coverage has a greater psychological impact
on viewers. 73 Nevertheless, it has not been established that broadcast
information has a greater effect than any other form of
communication; 74 in fact, some empirical studies suggest that the public
of evidentiary recordings will increase the level of publicity only incrementally and will be unlikely to have any appreciable additional prejudicial effect. See United States v. Criden (In re
National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). BuJ see United States v. Bolen,
8·Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981). Furthermore, in many cases in which recordings
are used as evidence, the defendant does not deny that the recorded events occurred and relies
instead on a legal defense such as entrapment. See, e.g., United States v. Jenrette (In re National
Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 009 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In such cases, broadcast of the evidence would
· not as directly prejudice the defendant's case as cases where the content of the recordings is
controverted or cases where radically different interpretations are placed on the recorded events.
11. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 451 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
72. All evidence presented to the jury out of court is potentially prejudicial. Repetition alone
may enhance the effect of the evidence. The federal rules allow the exclusion of even relevant
evidence if its value is outweighed by "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
Evm. 403. Moreover, prejudicial evidence is frequently admitted, when relevant, because courts
can control the prejudicial effects through limiting instructions. Indeed, in deciding whether to
admit evidence, courts consider the probable effectiveness of such instructions. See FED. R. Evm.
403 advisory committee note. The prejudicial effects of such evidence may be aggravated if jurors
are exposed to it again but without any limiting instructions.
Exposing jurors to evidentiary recordings out of court may present special problems. For example, it has been suggested that tapes might be edited to highlight the most incriminating portions with no opportunity for the defendant to bring forward his or her explanation or otherwise
place the recordings in context. See Estes v..Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 514 (1965) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring); United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Note, Copying and Broadcasting, supra note IS, at 575 n.159. But see Chandler
v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81 (1981).
13. See generally Note, Copying and Broadcasting, supra note 15, at 567 n.102, 515.
14. See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 681; see also Wrightsman, The American Trial Jury
on Trial: Empirical Evidence and Procedural Modlf,cations, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1978, at 137,
145. Despite the broadcast media's attempts to depict events dramatically, jurors are not necessarily
prejudiced by exposure to televised publicity. See Hoiberg & Stires, The Effect of Several Types
of Pretrial Publicity on the Guilt Attributions of Simulafed Jurors, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PYscHoLOGY
267, 274 (1973). The danger of prejudicial publicity arises from the capacity of the press to
create a general public perception of guilt or innocence prior to trial. But there is no reason
to believe the broadcast media is any more irreponsible than the print media. See Barber, The
Problem of Prejudice: A New Approach to Assessing the Impact of Courtroom Cameras, 66
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believes television news is biased. 75
Moreover, the broadcast of recordings could actually diminish the
possibility of prejudicial publicity in some cases by making re-enactments, with their attendant risks of misinterpretation, unnecessary. 16
Broadcast of evidentiary recordings might also corroborate an entrapment defense. 77 Consequently, to the extent that broadcast of the recordings has the potential for prejudicing jurors, there is no reason to
believe that the danger of prejudice is qualitatively different from that
presented by other forms of publicized evidence.
2. Methods of limiting adverse effects of broadcast publicity- The
potential prejudicial effect of broadcast evidentiary recordings can be
limited in a number of ways.
a. Instructions to the jury- The adverse prejudicial effect of publicity is minimized in part by the jurors' confidence in their superior
understanding of the case. 78 Moreover, jurors can be instructed to avoid
all news coverage of the trial. 7.9 If the trial or parts of the evidence
are broadcast, jurors can be specifically admonished not to watch
television. 80 Empirical research81 indicates that jurors do obey instructions not to expose themselves to news coverage about the case.

b. Other measures of jury control limiting the adverse effect of
broadcast of evidence- If the broadcast of evidentary recordings
presents a real danger of prejudicing the jury or makes it impossible
to select an impartial jury, traditional means of countering the adverse
effects of the broadcast can be as effective as denial of access to the recordJun1CATURE 248, 25S (1983) (attributing prejudice not to media exposure but to nature of the
trial process).
15. See G. COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN AMERICA 50 (1980); SCHOLARLY REsoURCES, INC., THE
GALLUP Pou: PUBLIC OPINION 1979, at 157-60 (1980). But see THE ROPER ORGAN1ZATION, INC.,
EVOLVING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TEI.EvlsION AND OTHER MAss MEDIA 1959-1980, at 3 (1980)
(majority of the public thinks news and information programs on television present a balanced
view).
16. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1262 n.4S (1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. 589 (1978).
11. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972).
78. See Kaplan, 0/ Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 623 (1977).
19. See United States v. Mouzin, 9 MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 13S7, 1361 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16,
1983); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 682.
80. The exposure of witnesses to trial proceedings presents similar problems. In at least one
. case a conviction has been appealed in part because of the exposure of a witness to televised
proceedings prior to testimony. The judge said, "This is something we didn't anticipate. But
it was not really different than a witness reading a newspaper before he testifies. In the future
we will probably make all witnesses sign a statement saying they will not watch television before
they testify." Cameras in Court, supra note S7, at 1213.
81. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). See generally Bridgeman &
Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. AP·
PLIED PSYCHOLOGY 91, 98 (1979); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom
and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 448-S0 (1977); Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News
Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. SIS (1977).
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ings. Trial courts have considerable experience in the use of voir dire
examinations, continuances, changes of venue, and sequestrations as
methods to counter the effects of prejudicial publicity. 82 Although the
effectiveness of some of these measures has been challenged, 83 there
is no reason to believe these measures are less successful in countering
prejudice resulting from broadcast publicity than prejudice from other
forms of publicity. 84
c. Acceptable levels of juror exposure to prejudicial information
as comparable irrespective of communication medium- The obvious
technical differences between broadcast and print publicity do not justify
a stricter standard for determining acceptable levels of juror exposure
to potentially prejudicial information when that information is
broadcast. 85 The goal of a perfect, impartial jury is continuously compromised by our country's firm commitment to a vigorous public discussion of the operation of the judicial system. As a result of these competing values, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Con-

82. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) (discussing ways to minimize the
effects of publicity on a jury). Courts prefer to screen out prejudiced veniremen, and extensive
voir dire examination can be an effective way to counter extensive prejudicial publicity. See
Padawer-Singer, Singer & Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57
JUDICATURE 386, 391 (1974).
83. See Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 561, 562-66 (1977). Continuances and changes of venue have sometimes been challenged
as violating the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971).
But see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (delay often works to the defendant's advantage
and whether fair trial rights are violated depends on the particular facts of the case).
The lilnited empirical research in this area is in conflict and methodologically deficient in several
respects. See generally Schmidt, supra note 81, at 444-49 (1977); Simon, supra note 81; Wrightsman,
supra note 74. The most serious shortcoming of virtually all empirical research in this area is
that the structure of the jury system for the most part prevents research on real juries; thus
research relies on simulations. Simulated juries differ significantly from real juries; simulation
cannot reproduce the "sense of solemn responsibility that undoubtedly has a powerful impact
on real jurors' subjectivity, conformity to group behavior and serious commitment to established
norms." Moreover, simulations are usually shorter than trials and so do not permit the diffusion
of the effect of exposure to publicity that naturally occurs over a longer period of time. See
Schmidt, supra note 81, at 448. Consequently, simulated studies will probably tend to exaggerate
the effect of prejudicial publicity on juror behavior.
84. Almost all studies have focused on print publicity and have considered broadcast publicity, if at all, only in the context of narrative accounts of news events. Nevertheless the conclusions regarding the effect of print publicity are probably equally applicable to broadcast publicity. Because there is no reason to believe that broadcast coverage is inherently more damaging
than print coverage, the effectiveness of curative measures for both is comparable. See generally
Barber, supra note 74, at 255; Wrightsman, supra note 74, at 145; Zimmerman, supra note 1,
at 681; Note, From Estes to Chandler: The Distinction Between Television and Newspaper
Coverage, 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 503 (1981).
85. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 (1981) ("[t]he risk of juror prejudice in some
cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed media; so also
the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast
coverage").
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stitution does not require flawless trials, 86 and that jurors need not
be completely ignorant of all facts relating to a case as long as they
are able to suspend their impressions or opinions and reach a verdict
based on the evidence presented at trial. 87 Appellate courts reviewing
claims of jury prejudice consider the "totality of circumstances" in
determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. 88 Courts
recognize that trials can meet constitutional standards despite widespread
hostile publicity. 89 This tolerance for the exposure of jurors to potentially prejudicial information should similarly be extended to the broadcast of evidentiary recordings.
3. Delay of access until after trial as unacceptable prohibition of
access- Postponing release of evidentiary recordings until after the
possibility for prejudice has passed in an effort to minimize the potential adverse effects of the broadcast of evidentiary recordings effectively prohibits access. Such a postponement would be justified only
in the extreme case where access must be denied as the only way of
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. Any indefinite postponement justified by a continuing possibility of prejudice should be unconstitutional; such a restraint of publication is not acceptable in the
context of the print media90 and should not be allowed in the context
of the broadcast media.
-4. Standards governing closure of criminal trials and prior restraints
as applicable to prohibitions on news media access to or broadcast
of recordings admitted in evidence- Because access to evidentiary
recordings is a correlative right of the recognized right of public access
to criminal trials,9 1 the standards for denying access to the recordings
after they have been introduced as evidence should be the same as the
standards for closing the criminal trial to the public.
86. It is enough that a defendant's rights are "scrupulously respected." McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971); accord Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 8S1 (1981).
87. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). To require total ignorance "[i]n these days of swift, widespread
and diverse methods of communication" would be to establish "an impossible standard." Id.
at 722-23.
88. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (197S); accord United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315
(10th Cir.) (affirming conviction where a prosecutor released copies of videotaped encounters
between the defendant and FBI undercover agents without trial court acquiescence and selected
portions were broadcast during the pendency of the trial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
89. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 56S (1976); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
S32, 561-62 (196S). Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (conviction struck
down due to "carnival atmosphere" of trial proceedings) with United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy, 3S1 U.S. 4S4, 463 (19S6) (conviction upheld against a claim of prejudicial publicity because
trial was conducted in a "calm judicial manner"). Prejudice of "constitutional dimensions"
must be demonstrated. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581-82 (1981).
90. See infra note 94.
91. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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The circumstances in which closure of a criminal trial is permissible
are extremely limited. 92 A useful test requires that a defend ant seeking
closure establish that it is "strictly and inescapably necessary in order
to protect the fair-trial guarantee. " 93
In prohibiting news media broadcast of evidentiary recordings of
which the news media have obtained copies, courts should be governed
by the severe restrictions that limit the imposition of prior restraints. 94
In determining whether a restraining order is an appropriate solution
to a problem of pretrial publicity, a court must consider the extent
of pretrial news coverage, whether other measures could mitigate the
effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity, and the effectiveness of a
restraining order in the particular instance before the court. 95 Only if
the defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be protected by less restrictive means is such a restraint allowable.
CONCLUSION

The right of the press to obtain access to evidentiary recordings used
in criminal trials requires constitutional protection. The common law
presumption of access currently employed by the courts does not give
adequate weight to the first amendment values underlying the presumption. Recognition of a constitutional right of access better allows the
press and public to fulfill their roles as guardians of the judicial system.
A constitutional right of press access can be accommodated with
a defendant's right to a fair trial in many cases. Courts should deny
news media access to evidentiary recordings only when there are no
92. The Supreme Court has not specifically elaborated acceptable criteria for closing criminal
trials, but the Court has stated that where access to a criminal trial is denied to inhibit disclosure
of sensitive infonnation, the denial must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest"
and "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102
S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1982) (dicta); see also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th
Cir. 1982). Prior to Globe Newspapers, the Court had indicated that a criminal trial must remain
open in the absence of an "overriding interest articulated in the findings." Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). Neither decision elaborated the nature of the countervailing interest necessary to justify closure.
93. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 440 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). At a minimum, the defendant should show that there is "a substantial
probability that irreparable damage to his fair-trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in public," that there is a "substantial probability that alternatives to closure will not
protect adequately his right to a fair trial," and that there is "a substantial probability that
closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm." Id. at 441--42.
94. The Court characterizes prior restraints as "the most serious and least tolerable infringement[s] on First Amendment rights," justified only in unusual cases. Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-62 (1976); see also supra note 9.
95. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). The concurring opinion
erected an even higher burden of proof. See id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring); see also id.
at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring).

FALL

1983]

Media Access to Evidentiary Recordings

139

effective alternative means to protect the defendant's right to a fair
trial. A denial of access should be justified by the same high burden
of proof currently imposed ori those seeking closure of a criminal trial
or a prior restraint on publication.

-Teri G. Rasmussen

